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RE: gulen movement Email-ID 146428 Reva ? -------- Original Message -------- Subject: RE: gulen movement Hi there, Just checking in. Did you ever hear back from your colleague? I'd love to talk with her... -------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Fred Burton [mailto:burton@stratfor.com] Alex - Am copying Reva on your question. She is a walking book on the Reva - Can you help Alex? Thanks! Fred On 10/12/2011 4:16 PM, Poolos, Alexandra wrote: Thank you for this...do you have a sense of whether this group is or seeks From: Fred Burton [mailto:burton@stratfor.com] Islam, Secularism and the Battle for Turkey 's Future August 23, 2010 | 1217 GMT PRINTPRINT Text Resize: 27 2ShareThis93 Islam, Secularism and the Battle for STRATFOR PDF Version o Click here to download a PDF of this report Related Link o The Geopolitics of Turkey: Searching for More A deep power struggle is under way in the Republic of Turkey . Most outside observers see this as the latest phase in the decades-long battle between Islamism and Kemalist secularism. Others paint it as traditional Anatolia's struggle against modern Istanbul , egalitarianism versus economic elitism or democracy's rise against authoritarianism. Ultimately, the struggle boils down to a fight over a single, universal concept: power. The following special report recounts how an Islamist-oriented Anatolia
has emerged to challenge the secular foundation of the modern Turkish
state. While those looking at Turkey from the outside are often unaware of
Turkey 's internal tumult, a labyrinthine internal power struggle
influences virtually every move Turkey makes in its embassies, schools,
courts, news agencies, military bases and boardrooms. Table of Contents o Origins of the Conflict A Power Struggle Rooted in Geopolitics Turkey occupies a key geostrategic position. It sits at the crossroads of Asia and Europe and forms a bridge between the Black and Mediterranean seas. Turkey 's core historically has centered on the isthmus that straddles the Sea of Marmara and Black Sea . Whether the map says Constantinople or Istanbul , whoever lays claim to the Bosporus and Dardanelles has control over one of the most active and strategic commercial routes in the world, a key military vantage point against outside invaders, and a launchpad for expansion into Eurasia . Islam, Secularism and the Battle for Turkey's Future (click here to enlarge image) When Turkey is powerful, the country follows a Pan-Islamic model and can extend itself far and wide, from ruling over the Arabs and balancing the Persians in the Middle East to challenging the clout of Christian Europe in the Balkans to blocking Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia . But when Turkey is weak, its neighborhood transforms from a geopolitical playground into a prison. Turkey , then the multiethnic Ottoman Empire , found itself in the latter
position at the end of World War I. With the aid of the victorious
European powers, currents of ethnic nationalism surged through the empire,
dissolving the bonds of Ottoman control. Times of crisis call for great leaders; for Turkey , that leader was
Mustafa Kemal - who earned the honorific "Ataturk," Turkish for "Father of
the Turks" - and whose face still graces statues, currency, paintings and
emblems in every corner of the country. To preserve his vision of the Turkish republic, Ataturk bolstered a
secular elite that would dominate the banks and industry and maintain a
firm grip over the country's armed forces. Ataturk regarded the Turkish
military as the guardian of the Kemalist state, a responsibility that
Turkish generals have frequently exploited to mount coups against the
civilian political authority. The post-World War I era saw Turkish expansion into Europe effectively blocked, leading Turkey to turn its attention inward toward the Anatolian Peninsula, focusing on consolidating power from within. Though it would take several decades to manifest itself, the rise of Anatolian forces that would challenge the supremacy of the Istanbul elite in many ways was inevitable. Indeed, as the 21st century approached, a tremor began spreading through
Turkey 's political landscape. By then, Turkey had gone through its fair
share of political tumult. But with time, it had consolidated enough
internally to start looking abroad again through a Pan-Islamic lens. The Islam, Secularism and the Battle for Turkey's Future JOHN THYS/AFP/Getty Images Turkish President Abdullah Gul Spearheaded by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President
Abdullah Gul, the party took power in 2002 with a mandate to close the
political and economic gap between the Kemalist elite and the Anatolian
masses. While more moderate than its predecessor, the AKP is largely
considered an affront by the secularists. Though the AKP was more cautious
of exposing its Islamist-rooted political vision in its early days of
power, it has become clear that the party represents those in Turkey who Table of Contents o Origins of the Conflict The Turkish Islamist Movement The AKP is by no means pursuing the Islamist vision alone. A powerful
force known as the Gulen movement has quietly and effectively penetrated
the armor of the Kemalist state over four decades. The charismatic imam
Fethullah Gulen, who lives in Pennsylvania , leads the transnational
organization, along with a small group of what the Gulenists term "wise
men." Inside Turkey , the Gulen movement follows a determined agenda that
aims to replace the Kemalist elite and transform Turkey into a more
religiously conservative society. Outside Turkey , Gulen presents itself The Kemalists have long viewed the Gulen movement as a critical threat to the secular nature of the Turkish republic. When Fethullah Gulen left Turkey for the United States in 1998, the court documents that had been issued against him included sermons in which he called on his followers to "move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers." He also said that "the time is not yet right. You must wait for the time when you are complete and conditions are ripe, until we can shoulder the entire world and carry it." More than a decade later, the Gulen movement has a presence in virtually
all Turkey 's power centers. In its earlier years, the movement moved much
more discreetly, focusing on moving into the "arteries of the system" without drawing attention to itself. Since 2007, however, when the AKP was
elected with 47 percent of the popular vote, conditions have ripened such
that the Gulen movement can be much more open about its activities in the
country. For its part, AKP does not walk in lockstep with the Gulen movement, nor does it want to become overly dependent on the Gulenists. The party does not see eye to eye with the Gulenists on a number of issues, and consciously attempts to keeps its distance from the group for fear of reinforcing secularist allegations that the AKP is pursuing a purely Islamist agenda. Likewise, the Gulenist movement will occasionally, albeit
rarely, air its disagreements with the AKP. For instance, in the wake of
the Turkish-Israeli flotilla crisis, in which nine Turkish citizens were
killed during a raid by Israeli special operations forces on a flotilla
full of pro-Palestinian activists, Fethullah Gulen said in an interview
that the Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH) aid group that led the flotilla had
defied authority for failing to seek permission from Israel before
attempting to deliver aid to Gaza. Yet Gulen's comments also caused an outrage amongst much of the Turkish public (not to mention within the AKP), leading one of the movement's leaders to retract the statements the next day. Clearly, tension exists between the AKP and Gulenists, but the two sides also need each other and share a desire to replace the traditional secular elite. This objective, along with the common threat they face from the secularist establishment, forms the basis of their symbiotic relationship: The Gulen movement provides the AKP with a social base, while the AKP provides the Gulenists with a political platform to push their agenda. Turkey 's wrenching struggle for national identity reaches every corner of
society. In the education realm, the Gulen movement is a powerful force,
creating schools across the globe to extend Turkish influence and
intelligence capabilities as the number of Turkish embassy staffers
educated in Gulenist schools continues to rise. The struggle is fiercest
in the security arena, with generals regularly being jailed over murky
coup allegations. Table of Contents o Origins of the Conflict Education: Sowing Seeds in the Schools Turkey 's power struggle begins in the classroom. The most intense period of ideological cultivation for many Turks takes place between grades eight
through 12, and the Gulen movement has spent the past three decades
working aggressively in the education sector to mold young minds in
Turkish schools at home and abroad. The AKP-run government distributes free textbooks published by a firm close to the Gulen movement in primary and high schools. Gulen-funded schools are increasing in number, along with thousands of public Imam Hatip schools and state-run Quran schools for high school education. Islam, Secularism and the Battle for MUSTAFA OZER/AFP/Getty Images Turkish girls in Istanbul wearing headscarves Since the AKP mostly appeals to Turkey 's religious conservative and
lower-income families, many of the party's potential political supporters
attend public technical schools for working-class laborers as well as
religiously oriented Imam Hatip schools, where girls are permitted to don
the Islamic headscarf, for their high school education instead of regular
high schools. Meanwhile, In an effort to change this system, the AKP government has been engaged in an intense struggle with the secularist-dominated State Council to revise the strict grade point average calculations such that graduates from all labor schools (including Imam Hatips) can enter all four-year universities (not only theological ones), from which they can rise to more prominent positions and remain loyal to the AKP and the Gulenists. The AKP has yet to succeed, but it has not given up on this crucial point on its education agenda. The Gulen movement claims the majority of Turkish students are enrolled in its private and public schools. The Gulenist schools are not madrassas; in fact, they focus heavily on the sciences and math. That said, religious classes and customs can make their way into the curriculum and daily activities, especially in countries with existing Islamic links. The Gulenist educational institutions are easily identified because they
typically have newer facilities and better equipment than most schools,
and they offer the most intensive preparation courses for university
entrance exams. These exams will make or break a Turkish student's career,
and are something most Turkish youths remember as the most dreaded and
stressful experience of their academic lives. Students who have taken these courses describe how the "elder brothers" who run these Lighthouses maintain an intense curriculum that keeps the
students at school late and on the weekends instead of out socializing and
engaging in behavior frowned upon by religious conservatives. Students may
start going to Lighthouses two to three times a week, but can find
themselves attending nearly every day of the week by the time they reach
the end of the course. The Gulen movement and AKP have carried their presence to the university
level as well. The pivot of the university battle is an institution called
the Higher Education Council (YOK). YOK was created by the 1982 Turkish
Constitution to keep a lid on political dissent in the universities, since
prior to the 1980 military coup, universities were the driving forces
behind the political violence between right- and left-wing activists that
marred the 1970s in Turkey . Up until 2007, YOK was a bastion for hardcore When the last secular president of YOK retired in 2007, the AKP had its
chance to appoint one of its own, professor Yusuf Ziya Ozcan, an AKP
loyalist and sympathizer of the Gulen movement. Since then, YOK has been
at the forefront of the highly polarizing headscarf issue in Turkey and
has used its powers to appoint religious conservatives to university
presidencies. Strategic Placement But the Gulen movement and AKP do not only want loyal students to attend
Gulen-run universities. Indeed, a core part of their strategy is to ensure
the placement of their students in a variety of secular institutions where
they can gradually grow in number and position themselves to influence Gulenist Schools' Expanding Global Influence Over the past few decades the Gulen movement has spread to virtually every
corner of the globe through its expansive education network. The Gulenist
international footprint comprises 1,000 private schools (according to
Gulen estimates) spanning 115 countries, including 35 African countries. Like their counterparts in Turkey , the facilities and quality of
instruction at these schools are excellent, making them attractive places
for elite families of various ethnicities to send their children to The curriculum at these schools includes math, science, and Turkish- and
English-language instruction, but there is a deeper agenda involved than
pedagogy. Graduates of these schools can usually speak Turkish fluently,
have been exposed to Turkish culture and history, and are prepared for
careers in high places. In regions like Africa and Central Asia in
particular, where quality education is difficult to come by, the children
of the political elites who attend these schools usually have developed a
deep affinity for Turkish culture. The Gulenists have made a conscious attempt to avoid the perception that
they are proselytizing to students through these schools, however. Lessons
in Islam tend to be more prevalent in Gulenist schools where the religion
already has a foothold. As such, the Gulenists are not welcome everywhere they would like to set
up. Iran and Saudi Arabia , neither of which wants a foreign strand of
Islam influencing its people, have both shut the Gulenist schools out. In
the Netherlands , where concerns over the growth of Islam run particularly
high, the government has tried to force out Gulenist institutions. Such resistance is likely to increase as the movement's profile rises and as countries grow nervous over Turkey 's expanding influence. In places like Africa, however, where countries are desperate for development, Muslims are in abundance, chaotic conditions prevail and foreign competition lacks the intensity it has in strategic battlegrounds like Central Asia , the Gulen movement has far more room to expand its educational, business and political ties. Table of Contents o Origins of the Conflict Security: Taking on the Military Ataturk, a military man at heart, wanted to ensure his work and vision for
Turkey would remain intact long after his death. The Turkish armed forces
seized responsibility for that legacy upon his death. Article 35 of the
Army Internal Service Law of 1935 gives the military the constitutional
right to protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the republic. Islam, Secularism and the Battle for Turkey's Future ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty Images Turkish soldiers at Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara Turkish generals throughout much of Turkey's history interpreted these
laws as permitting the armed forces to intervene in civilian affairs
whenever stability was threatened or the secular fabric of the country
showed signs of unraveling. Consequently, Turkey has experienced three
military coups - in 1960, 1971 and 1980 - and one "soft coup" in 1997,
when the military worked through the National Security Council to bring
down the government without dissolving the parliament or suspending the
Constitution. Turkey 's Islamists knew that if they had any chance of overturning the power balance of the state, they would have to take on the armed forces. The process would be slow, quiet and deliberate, but would ultimately see the military stripped of its long-held untouchable status. From Deep State to Ergenekon The Gulen movement began this task with the police intelligence services. The Islamists now had a powerful tool with which to undercut their
secularist rivals. Not only did they enjoy the pervasiveness of a security
network that patrols the vast majority of Turkey 's population and the
wiretapping capabilities to investigate the bowels of the security
establishment, they also had a powerful machine in the form of the AKP to
uproot the Deep State and neutralize the military's grip over the
government. Though there is little doubt that elements of the Deep State were
legitimately rolled up in this Ergenekon probe, there is also reason to
believe that this probe took on a life of its own - and increasingly Breaking Precedent with Jailed Generals A new and even more politically explosive coup plot was revealed in
January by Taraf, a newspaper regularly praised by Gulenists. The plot,
called "Balyoz," Turkish for "Sledgehammer," allegedly involved 162
members of the armed forces, including 29 generals. The group reportedly The military was backed against a wall. Though it still had enough
influence over the courts to fight the arrests, there was no question it
was locked into an uphill battle against the Islamist forces. The While the AKP and Gulen movement already have de facto ownership of the
country's police intelligence, they are also making significant inroads
into MIT, the national intelligence service. Long dominated by the
secularist establishment, MIT historically spent a good portion of its
time keeping tabs on domestic political opponents like the AKP. The
Turkish National Security Council in late May appointed 42-year-old
bureaucrat Hakan Fidan as the new MIT chief. Islam, Secularism and the Battle for KAYHAN OZER/AFP/Getty Images Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (L) with outgoing military chief Gen. Ilker Basbug and soldiers near the Turkey-Iraq border It has now become all the more imperative for the military to maintain a
hold on the security issues that still give the armed forces some leverage
against the AKP. The Kurdish question and the dispute with Greece over
Cyprus top this list, but even here the AKP is working aggressively to
take ownership of these issues by recasting them as inherently political
problems resolvable through economic development and diplomacy as opposed
to military might. Table of Contents o Origins of the Conflict Media and Business: Challenging the Secular Establishment Controlling the Message Turkey 's media sits at the center of the country's power struggle. Newspapers are the source of leaks that have thrown generals in jails, courtrooms are filled with legal battles between media agencies and op-eds spar daily over which ideological direction the country should take. The media is an especially potent tool in the Gulenist and AKP fight
against the armed forces. The vast majority of leaks in the Ergenekon and
Sledgehammer probes mysteriously emanated from a single newspaper, Taraf.
Taraf was founded in 2007 as a paper for liberal democrats shortly before Most of Turkey 's predominantly secularist media, including the dailies
Hurriyet, Milliyet and Cumhurriyet, have been around as long as the
republic itself. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, Islamist forces Islam, Secularism and the Battle (click here to enlarge image) The most prominent media war in this power struggle is being played out
between Dogan Media, owned by one of Turkey 's leading business
conglomerates, and Feza Yayincilik media group, with Dogan's Hurriyet and
Feza's Zaman newspapers respectively at the epicenter of the battle. Dogan While tax fraud is relatively common in Turkey 's media sector across the
political spectrum, and Dogan Media was no exception, suspicions run deep
that Dogan was singled out as an example to other media of what can happen
to a powerful business tycoon who challenges the AKP. Anatolia Takes on the Istanbul Business Elite A handful of secular family conglomerates based in Istanbul have dominated Turkey 's business sector for decades, serving as Turkey 's economic outlet to the rest of the world. On the other side of the struggle stand the millions of small- and medium-sized businesses with roots in more religiously and socially conservative Anatolia . While the secular-nationalists still enjoy the upper hand in the business world, the Anatolian tigers are slowly gaining ground. At present, the Turkish economy is dominated by names like Sabanci, Koc,
Dogan, Dogus, Zorlu and Calik. Dogan Media occupies the staunchly secular
niche of the business sector at odds with the AKP's Islamist-rooted
vision, and has taken a public stand against the ruling party. Sabanci and
Dogus also belong in the staunchly secular group, but tend to exhibit a
more neutral stance in public toward the AKP for business reasons, such as
avoiding the sort of legal battles Dogan has faced. Islam, Secularism and the Battle for ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty Images Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan The lines dividing Turkey 's business, media and politics have become
increasingly blurred over the years. Several of Turkey 's prominent
business conglomerates contain media outlets, and the AKP has worked to
keep those media outlets friendly, or at least neutral. Those that oblige
often obtain business deals with the state, while those that resist can
find themselves slapped with lawsuits or having to transform their
newspapers into mostly apolitical tabloids to avoid political pressure.
Calik Group is perhaps the most obvious example of the corporate benefits
that can follow a healthy relationship with the AKP. This intersection between politics and business can also be seen in the energy sector. The AKP has a strategy to boost four energy firms in the country that have aligned themselves with the ruling party. The firms are divided among Turkey 's four main energy areas of interest: Ciner's Park Teknik in Russia , SOM in Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan , Inci in Iraq , and AKSA in Turkey . Park Teknik and AKSA are expected to work together to pursue a deal with Russia to build Turkey 's first nuclear power plant. Islam, Secularism and the Battle for The AKP and Gulen movement lack the leverage the secularist-nationalists
hold in the banking sector, but that has not stopped them from finding
resources to finance strategic projects, as the Sabah takeover
demonstrates. Banks such as Turkiye Is Bankasi - created by Ataturk in the
early days of the republic to maintain a secular stronghold on the
country's finances - are difficult to compete with, but state-owned Ziraat
Bankasi has increasingly become the AKP's go-to bank. Ziraat bank CEO Can The Gulenist Business Cycle The AKP and Gulen movement recognize the lack of space for competition
with the Western-oriented trade markets ruled by Koc, Sabanci and the
other secularist business elites. Instead, the Islamist forces have
created their own business model, one that speaks for Anatolia and focuses
on accessing markets in places like the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia,
Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region. As opposed to the Istanbul-entrenched secularist corporations, most
businessmen who belong to TUSKON and MUSIAD hail from small, generally
poorer and religiously conservative towns and cities across Anatolia .
TUSKON is tightly linked into the Gulen movement and forms an integral
part of the Gulenist business, education, political and even foreign A small-business owner from the eastern Anatolian city of Gaziantep makes
a living manufacturing and selling shirt buttons. A Gulenist invites the
buttonmaker to a TUSKON business conference in Africa, where he will be
put into contact with a shirtmaker from Tanzania who will buy his buttons. Table of Contents o Origins of the Conflict Foreign Policy: Enabling the Rise The Gulenist transnational network is a natural complement to the AKP's
foreign policy agenda. While many within the secularist and nationalist
camp are highly uncomfortable with the notion of Pan-Islamism and
Pan-Turkism - strategies that, in their eyes, brought about the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire - AKP followers embrace their Ottoman past and favor
an expansionist agenda. Members of the secularist camp historically have dominated Turkey 's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They continue to maintain a strong presence
in Turkish embassies, since Turkish diplomats, as in many countries,
generally must serve an average of 20 years before they reach a position
of influence. But this, too, is gradually shifting under AKP rule: Foreign The Turkish Cooperation Development Agency (TIKA) is also key to these
foreign policy efforts. The Turkish government created TIKA in the early
1990s to forge ties with former Soviet countries with which it enjoyed a
shared Turkic heritage, though TIKA did not make much headway initially.
The AKP, however, reinvigorated the TIKA in recent years for use as a
public diplomacy tool, transforming it into a highly active development
agency. Some Gulenists privately boast that their institutions abroad, whether
schools, hospitals or other types of developmental agencies, serve as
useful intelligence satellites for the Foreign Ministry. If a problem
erupts in a country in Central Asia , for example, where press freedoms Success in Image Control AKP officials often deny Gulenist claims of serving as intelligence satellites for fear the AKP could be seen as pursuing a subversive global Islamist agenda. Indeed, some on the far left in Turkey have characterized the Gulen movement as a group of violent Islamist extremists ultimately aiming to impose Shariah in Turkey . Though inaccurate, this view belongs to a fringe group within the secularist camp that wants to reverse Turkey 's trajectory. For this reason, the AKP has made a considerable effort to pursue
negotiations with the European Union for full-fledged membership despite
the high probability such talks are unlikely to lead anywhere. Poll
numbers reveal how Turks increasingly are realizing that the chances of EU
membership have become a distant possibility. Image control becomes especially important in Turkey 's relationship with
the United States . Keeping Turkey 's EU bid alive and relations with Washington on an even
keel will thus help the Islamists undermine secularist efforts to portray
the AKP in a negative light abroad. Though the AKP will continue to keep a
fair bit of distance from the Gulen in its dealings abroad to protect this Table of Contents o Origins of the Conflict Judiciary: Neutralizing the High Courts Whether the issue is headscarves worn in universities, media firms charged with tax evasion or soldiers charged with coup-plotting, virtually every strand of Turkey 's power struggle eventually finds its way to the courts. The dividing line in the judiciary lies between the secularist-dominated high courts and the AKP-influenced low courts. This division results in a dizzying judicial system in which court rulings are often mired in political mayhem. The high judiciary in Turkey is made up of the Constitutional Court (or "Anayasa Mahkemesi" in Turkish), the High Court of Appeals ("Yargitay"),
the State Council ("Danistay"), and the High Panel Supreme Board of Judges
and Prosecutors (HSYK). The headscarf controversy is perhaps the best illustration of the struggle
between religious and secularist forces in the judiciary. Turkey 's
secularist-dominated State Council has long barred Turkish women from
wearing the headscarf in the public sector, making it difficult for Secularists continue to hold the upper hand against the Islamists in the
judiciary. Through their dominance of the high courts, the secularists
hold the single most potent weapon in this struggle: The ability to ban
political parties for violating the secular tradition of the state. The
AKP is all too familiar with this threat. With some modifications, this package of constitutional amendments calls
for several critical changes. One is the restructuring of the
Constitutional Court and HSYK, ending the secularist monopoly and giving
the lower judiciary more clout. For example, the HYSK reforms call for
increasing its membership from seven to 21, 10 of whom would be selected
by 12,000 judges and prosecutors in lower courts across the country -
where the AKP enjoys significant influence - while five would be appointed
by the president. As expected, secularists in the high courts and the parliament - with
behind-the-scenes military backing - strongly oppose these changes,
charging that they will eliminate checks and balances in the government. The package of constitutional amendments got approval from the Constitutional Court and barely made it through Turkey 's parliament on May 7, with 336 votes in favor. While this passed the 330 threshold needed for the government to put the proposals to a referendum, the parliamentary vote fell short of the two-thirds majority needed to adopt the amendments without a referendum. The public referendum will be held Sept. 12, the anniversary of the 1980 military coup. Islam, Secularism and the Battle for ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty Images A man holds a portrait of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in front of Ataturk's The battle lines are thus drawn, and the struggle will be fierce in the
months ahead. AKP and Gulen leaders cannot claim with confidence that the
referendum will pass, but if it does, the Islamists will establish the
legal foundation to accelerate their political rise. If the referendum
collapses, the secularists will retain the most critical weapon in their
arsenal to uphold the Kemalist traditions of the republic. On 10/12/2011 2:33 PM, Poolos, Alexandra wrote: Hi Fred,
Wondering if you might be able to check your resources about any ongoing federal investigations into a Turkish group operating schools here in the U.S. It's called the Gulen movement and is run by Fethullah Gulen. Apparently the FBI investigated them several years ago, but we've heard Now sure if this is something you can look into, but any info you might be How are you? -Alex |
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